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I. Introduction1
In recent years mergers have become one of the most widely
utilized planning methods in the hospital industry.2 Concomitantly,
antitrust challenges to hospital mergers have emerged. This article
will address one of the most important issues a hospital corporation
must face in determining whether its anticipated merger with a hos-
pital will survive scrutiny by a court of law: How to measure the
product and geographical markets in the merger of hospitals.
This article will also address the issue of market measurements,
first, by giving a general background on how the courts analyze the
issue of relevant markets in most industries and, second, through a
discussion of the different approaches taken by the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) and courts in the analysis of the relevant market
in the merger of hospitals. Finally, it will discuss why the approach
taken by the courts and the FTC is unfair to hospitals.
A. The Purpose of the Antitrust Laws
The purpose of antitrust laws is to prevent anticompetitive con-
duct.' The underlying assumption is that a competitive market is the
best mechanism for allocating the resources of society, and, there-
fore, the best way to achieve economic efficiency.' Since the goal of
antitrust law is to foster competition, many persons argue that anti-
trust laws should not apply to the hospital industry which operates in
a noncompetitive manner. The following arguments have been ad-
1. For a general background on the law of mergers, see L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW OF ANTITRUST, 575-675 (1977); P. MARCUS, ANTITRUST LAW AND PRACTICE, §§
201-40 (1980); E. GELLHORN, ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS, 302-48 (1981); ANTITRUST
LAW DEVELOPMENTS, 1984 A.B.A. SEC. ANTITRUST 149-58; A. STICKELLS, FEDERAL CONTROL
OF BUSINESS, ANTITRUST LAWS, § 92-110 (1972); 54 AM. JUR.2D Monopolies, Restraints of
Trade and Unfair Trade Practices §§ 128-29 (1971).
For an excellent discussion of antitrust issues in the health care field including market
measurements, see Joint Program on Competition, Economic Change and Antitrust Issues in
the Health Care Industry ABA FORUM COMMITTEE ON HEALTH LAW AND SECTION OF ANTI-
TRUST (1984); Note, Hospital Antitrust: The Merging Hospital and the Resulting Exposure
to Antitrust Merger and Monopolization Laws, 24 WASHBURN L.J. 300 (1985); Miles &
Philp, Hospitals Caught in the Antitrust Net: An Overview, 24 Duo. L. REV. 489 (1985);
Schramm & Renn, Hospital Mergers, Market Concentration and the Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index, 33 EMORY L.J. 869 (1984).
2. P. NUTT. PLANNING METHODS FOR HEALTH AND RELATED ORGANIZATIONS, 26-31
(1984).
3. Some commentators argue that the antitrust laws were enacted for other purposes as
well.*See R. POSNER & F. EASTBROOK, ANTITRUST, CASES, ECONOMIC NOTES AND OTHER
MATERIALS, 152-70 (1980).
4. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 342-44 (1979).
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vanced to support this proposition:
(1) [N]early all hospital transactions are covered by some form
of third-party payment, reducing the importance of price as a
competitive variable; (2) hospitals are paid on a cost-reimburse-
ment basis, and cost-based reimbursement removes incentives
for efficiency; and (3) patients lack price information that is
needed to make choices about their care, and instead rely on
their physician, who is no more price-sensitive than the patient.5
The courts and the FTC have disagreed and held that competi-
tion does exist in the hospital industry. Courts have found competi-
tion among hospitals through the hospital's desire to procure the best
physicians for that respective medical staff. Hospitals compete for
physicians in order to attract patients to their facilities. Both the
courts and FTC have found that hospitals also compete for the
granting of Certificates of Need.6 Either a hospital will try to get a
Certificate of Need to expand its own facilities or it will oppose the
granting of a Certificate of Need to another hospital in the same
region. Clearly, if one hospital gets approval for expansion it is quite
probable that other hospitals in the area will lose patients to the hos-
pital with the new facilities.7
B. Antitrust Laws that Affect the Merger of Hospitals
With the development of hospital management corporations, the
merger of hospitals began to increase. Hospital management corpo-
rations try to minimize management cost by buying hospitals in the
same region. Theoretically, they can lower costs by sharing manage-
ment resources between the various hospitals in the chain. Con-
versely, if a substantial number of hospitals in one region are owned
or operated by the same company there may be a problem of monop-
olization. Further, the potential for collusion among the hospitals in
the region is increased if the hospitals are owned by two or three
5. In re American Medical Int'l Inc., 104 F.T.C. 1, 179 (1984).
6. A Certificate of Need is a document given by a state agency that authorizes the
expenditure of money for the construction of hospitals, purchase of equipment, or other cost
related transactions in the health care field. Certificate of Need legislation is designed to con-
trol the rising cost of services offered by health care providers by avoiding unnecessary expend-
itures. See T. CHRISTOFFEL, HEALTH AND THE LAW 143 (1982).
7. Of course, prior to deciding a case the court must establish jurisdiction. Both the
Sherman Act and the Clayton Act require either that the trade occurred in interstate com-
merce or that it affected interstate commerce. See Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex
Hosp., 425 U.S. 738 (1976); Nurse Midwifery Associates v. Hibbett, 1984-1 Trade Case.
(CCH), 65957 (M.D. Tenn. 1983).
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corporations. 8 The antitrust laws were enacted to prevent these types
of anticompetitive activities; specifically section 7 of the Clayton
Act,9 section 2 of the Sherman Act,1" and section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act.1
Section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits acquisitions of stock or
assets of another person also engaged in commerce or affecting com-
merce "where in any line of commerce or in any activity affecting
commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisi-
tion may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create
a monopoly."' 2
Section 2 of the Sherman Act prohibits monopolization. Section
5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act prohibits unfair methods of
competition. These offenses require proof of some negative effect on
competition. For example, a violation of the Clayton Act, must
lessen competition in the particular trade or business concerned.
Before determining what effect a proposed monopolization will have
on competition, there must be a determination of the relevant mar-
ket that will be affected by the monopolization.
13
The relevant market includes both the relevant product market
and the relevant geographical market."' It is important to determine
which regions or products will comprise the market. If the relevant
8. There may be collusion because the fewer the number of owners, the easier it is to
form a cartel, to raise prices and restrict output to the detriment of the consumers.
9. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1982).
10. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
I1. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1982).
12. In re American Medical Int'l Inc., 104 F.T.C. 1, 190 (emphasis in original) (quoting
15 U.S.C. § 18).
13. The measurement of the effect on competition on the already determined market
will not be considered in this article. Usually courts use quantitative and qualitative factors to
measure the competitive effects. As aid, courts use the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) to
determine post merger increases in competition. Under the Index, the courts will add the
squares of the market shares of each corporation. In synthesis, the policy of the Justice De-
partment with respect to the HHI is the following: If the number is less than 1,000 it will find
the market unconcentrated and generally will not challenge the merger. It will probably find a
moderately concentrated market if the numbers add to or between 1,000-1,800, and if the
increase was of 100 points or less the department probably will not challenge the action. If the
number is 1,800 or above, and if the increase in points has been between 50 and 100 the
Department will look at other factors. If the increase is less than 50 points the challenge is
unlikely. Any increase of greater than 100 points opens the potential merger to challenge. U.S.
Department of Justice Merger Guidelines 2 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH), 4493 at 6879-13,
6879-14 (1984). See generally Calkins, The New Merger Guidelines and the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index, 71 CAL. L. REv. 402 (1983) (discusses the 1982 Merger Guidelines). See
also Symposium, infra note 87 (includes analysis of the HHI).. Schramm & Renn, Hospital
Mergers, Market Concentration and the Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index, 33 EMORY L.J. 869
(1984); Miller, The Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index as a Market Structure Variable: An Expo-
sition for Antitrust Practitioners, 27 ANTITRUST BULL. 593 (1982).
14. See, White & White, Inc. v. American Hosp. Supply Corp., 723 F.2d 495 (6th Cir.
1983); Pontius v. Children's Hosp., 552 F. Supp. 1352 (W.D. Pa. 1982).
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market is a narrow one, it is very probable that a merger of hospitals
in that region will amount to monopolization or will lessen competi-
tion. If the relevant market comprised the nation as a whole, a
merger of hospitals in one region will probably be safe because all of
the hospitals in the nation will be considered competitors. The ques-
tion then becomes how to measure those markets, and further, how
those standards are applicable to the merger of hospitals.
II. Product and Geographical Market Measurements in General
A. Product Market
The Supreme Court of the United States in its landmark deci-
sion of Brown Shoe Co. v. United States15 stated that the "outer
boundaries of a product market are determined by the reasonable
interchangeability of use or the cross-elasticity of demand between
the product itself and substitutes for it." 1 In other words, the prod-
uct maker will include all those products that are considered reason-
able substitutes by buyers. An example of how the notions of "rea-
sonable interchangeability of use" and "cross-elasticity of demand"
function can be seen by examining the reactions of buyers to an in-
crease in the price of a product sold by a company. If an increase in
the price of product number "one" causes many of its buyers to
purchase product number "two," then the cross-elasticity of demand
for the product is said to be high and product number "two" will be
included in the relevant product market. If, however, an increase in
the price of product number "one" has no effect on the choices of the
buyers, then it is said that the two products are not substitutes and
that the cross-elasticity of demand for that product is low. There-
fore, in the latter case, product number "two" will be excluded from
the relevant product market. The substitute products generally are
included in the relevant market because they represent a constraint
on the market power" that a company may exercise.
In addition to the cross elasticity of demand, the Court has con-
sidered other indicia such as the "industry or public recognition of
the submarket [or market]18 as a separate economic entity, the prod-
15. 370 U.S. 294 (1962). See R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX (1978) which deals
with the Brown Shoe decision in Chapter 9.
16. 370 U.S. at 325.
17. Market Power is the ability to raise prices above competitive levels by restricting
output.
18. Most of the factors presented by the court apply to markets as well as to sub-
markets. Posner has criticized the submarket approach as "unsound." As he suggests, some of
the criteria listed by the court in Brown Shoe are relevant in determining markets. See R.
91 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW WINTER 1986
uct's peculiar characteristics and uses, unique production facilities,
distinct customers, distinct prices . . . and specialized vendors."1 9
Further, many courts look at the cross-elasticity of supply to deter-
mine whether certain sellers should be included as producers in the
relevant market.20 As with the concept of cross-elasticity of demand,
the concept of cross-elasticity of supply helps to delineate the outer
boundaries of a product market. There is a high cross-elasticity of
supply when entry into the industry is easy. 2' There is also a high
cross-elasticity of supply if other existing companies can expand
their output, due to an increase in the price of the product in ques-
tion. By increasing the output, an increase in the number of substi-
tute products that buyers may turn to in the event of a price increase
occurs.
In the hospital industry low cross-elasticity of supply is illus-
trated by the necessity of obtaining a Certificate of Need. If a hospi-
tal increases the prices it charges for certain services, a group of
investors cannot get together and build a hospital to compete with
the existing hospital without obtaining a Certificate of Need. With-
out the Certificate of Need, hospitals will not be constructed.1
2
Therefore, there is a barrier that makes entry into the industry diffi-
cult. As a result, the market definition in the hospital industry is
relatively narrow because the number of hospitals included in the
market would usually be small.
Finally, "price/quality differences" are also relevant in analyz-
ing a merger because the buyer's willingness to purchase a product
depends largely on characteristics such as quality and price of the
POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE, 125-33 (1976).
19. Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 325.
20. Twin City Sportservice, Inc. v. Charles 0. Finley & Co., 512 F.2d 1264 (9th Cir.
1975).
21. For example, if the acquired and acquiring companies are engaged in delivery of
nursing home care, but a third company is engaged in the delivery of acute care hospital
services, then the third company will not be included as a seller in the relevant market. This is
so if we assume that acute care hospital services are not a substitute for the delivery of nursing
home care services. If, however, upon a slight increase in the price of nursing home care the
third company can use its resources to provide nursing home care, then the cross-elasticity of
supply is said to be high. The company will be included in the relevant market. On the other
hand, if the third company can only convert part of its means of production for the delivery of
nursing home care, then there should be a determination of what percentage of its means of
production is a real challenge to the provider of nursing home care. Then, if the percentage is
high, the providers will be in the same market. Again, the focus of the courts seems to be
directed at including in the market those companies which supply products that may restrain
the market power that a company may exercise. See P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST
LAWS: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST LAWS AND THEIR APPLICATION 375 (1980).
22. Without a Certificate of Need hospitals are not reimbursed by Medicaid.
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product that serves as a substitute.23 These standards for measuring
the relevant product market should not be applied mechanically.
Careful consideration must be given, in particular, to special charac-
teristics of the industry and to the facts of the particular case.
B. Geographical Market
The geographical market of a product is determined by an ex-
amination of the region in which competing companies sell their
products. The Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of
United States v. Philadelphia National Bank,2" suggested that the
geographical area is the region in which "the seller operates, and to
which the purchaser can practicably turn for supplies."25 The geo-
graphical market may be as broad as the nation or as narrow as a
small town.
26
Generally, if the price of product "x" in one location is different
from the price of product "x" in another location, then there are two
separate geographical markets. It has been suggested that sales pat-
terns may also aid in the determination of the geographical mar-
ket. 7 A separate geographical market arises where localized sales
patterns occur.
When making geographical market determinations, courts also
consider other factors. One such factor is the "market barrier."
Transportation costs are one form of market barrier. The effect of
transportation costs in delineating the geographical market "depends
entirely on the relation to prices in the area concerned, and on the
presence or absence of cross-shipments."2 8 As a general proposition,
if the transportation costs from one area to another are higher than
the difference of the price of products sold in the two areas, then the
two areas will be considered separate geographical markets. 29
Since courts try to take what is called a "practicability ap-
proach" in determining geographical markets, they also look at other
indicia, such as availability of alternative suppliers, industry recogni-
23. Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. 294, 326 (1962).
24. 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
25. 374 U.S. at 359 (quoting from Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S.
320, 327 (1961)) (emphasis in original).
26. For an analysis of the relationship of the geographical market delineation between
section 2 of the Sherman Act and section 7 of the Clayton Act, see Comment, Relevant Geo-
graphic Market Delineation: Interchangeability of Standards in Cases Arising Under Section
2 of the Sherman Act and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 1979 DUKE L.J. 1152.
27. See supra note 21.
28. For the effect of one-way or two-way shipments in regard to this proposition see
supra note 21.
29. See supra note 21 at 368.
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tion, and the commercial realities of the industry. Consumer conve-
nience and preference are also considered. In the case of a hospital,
patients may prefer a hospital that is close to their residence. This
suggests that the farther apart two hospitals are located, the more
probable it is that they belong to different geographical markets.
Finally, it must be understood that in the case of the relevant
geographical market, as well as in the case of the product market,
the analysis should not be mechanical. There must be an assessment
of a relevant market that reflects as closely as possible the economic
realities of the industry in question, and the particular facts of the
individual case.
C. Bank Mergers - the Road to Hospital Merger Challenges
In several ways, bank mergers are analogous to hospital merg-
ers. It is instructive to consider the mechanics of both mergers and to
consider the analysis the courts have used in deciding bank merger
cases. These decisions can provide insight into the analysis with
which courts are likely to treat the mergers of hospitals.
In Philadelphia National Bank3 ° the United States challenged
the merger of two banks. The Supreme Court stated that it was not
difficult to determine the relevant product and geographical mar-
kets."' The defendant alleged that because banks belong to a regu-
lated industry and are providers of "services," there is no illegal ef-
fect on competition. The Supreme Court responded to the argument
by stating:
So also, we reject the position that commercial banking, because
it is subject to a high degree of governmental regulation, or be-
cause it deals in the intangibles of credit and services rather
than in the manufacture or sale of tangible commodities, is
somehow immune from the anticompetitive effects of undue con-
centration. Competition among banks exists at every level -
price, variety of credit arrangements, convenience of location,
[and] attractiveness of physical surroundings .... a'
The Supreme Court rejected the defendants' argument that, be-
cause they were a service industry, the treatment given by the Court
should be lenient. Hospitals also provide services; this supports the
30. 374 U.S. 321 (1962). For a discussion of market measurements in bank merger
cases, see Bronsteen, Product Market Definition in Commercial Bank Merger Cases, 30 ANTI-
TRUST BULL. 677 (1985).
31. 374 U.S. at 356.
32. Id. at 368.
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proposition that if banks cannot raise the defense that they are a
service industry, hospitals are similarly precluded from raising the
defense.
Philadelphia National Bank is clearly a predictor of challenges
to mergers in the health care industry. The inevitable has hap-
pened.33 Soon it will be apparent in what manner the courts, the
FTC, and the Department of Justice will apply the concepts of the
relevant product and geographical market to hospital mergers and
acquisitions.
III. Hospital Mergers - Case Law Analysis - From Humana,
Inc.,34 to Hospital Corp. of America"'
As suggested, hospitals have not been able to escape the appli-
cability of the antitrust laws. To date, a number of hospital proprie-
tary chains have been challenged under section 7 of the Clayton
Act. 36 It should be noted that these proprietary chains are some of
33. Besides hospital mergers being challenged, other mergers by health care providers
have been under attack. The Justice Department has challenged the acquisition of the capital
stock of Southern Medical Services, Inc. by Beverly Enterprises, two providers of nursing
home care. In the case of United States v. Beverly Enterprises, Inc., 1984-1 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 66052, the Justice Department alleged that the acquisition would substantially lessen
competition in providing nursing home care. It is interesting to note that the Department also
alleged, as it has done in the challenge of hospital mergers, that the anticompetitive impact of
the acquisition is increased because new entrants need a Certificate of Need to compete in the
business. A consent decree was entered in the Beverly Enterprises case on June 7, 1984, which
provided that if eight of the installations are divested the acquisition will be permitted. Id.
34. American Medicorp v. Humana, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 589 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
35. 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 22301 (Oct. 25, 1985). For an excellent analysis of the
cases discussed in this section, see Proger, The Unique Analytical Problems Presented by Hos-
pital and other Provider Mergers and Horizontal Integrations, American Bar Association,
Forum Committee on Health Law and Section of Antitrust, Joint Programs on Competition,
Economic Change and Antitrust Issues in the Health Care Industry, A.B.A. (Feb. 2-4, 1984);
Sims & McDonald, Defining Product and Geographical Markets in Health Care Cases,
American Bar Association, Forum Committee on Health Law and Section of Antitrust, Joint
Program on Competition, Economic Change and Antitrust Issues in the Health Care Indus-
try, A.B.A. (Feb. 2-4, 1984); Miles, Hospital Mergers and Antitrust Laws: An Overview, 29
ANTITRUST BULL. 253 (1984); Miles & Philip, Hospitals Caught in the Antitrust Net: An
Overview, 24 DuQ. L. REv. 489 (1985).
36. American Medicorp v. Humana, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 589 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (relevant
product market was the delivery of acute care hospital services to doctors and patients; each
Health Services Area was a relevant geographical market in which the plaintiff had to show
the likely impact of a merger); In re American Medical Int'l Inc., 104 F.T.C. 177 (1984)
(relevant product market was the general acute care hospital services; the geographical market
was San Luis Obispo County and the city of San Luis Obispo); United States v. Hospital
Affiliates Int'l, Inc., 1980-81 Trade Cas. (CCH) T 63,721 (1980) (product market was defined
to be inpatient psychiatric care; the geographical area included inpatient psychiatric care by
private psychiatric hospitals and non-governmental acute care hospitals in the locality); Hospi-
tal Corp. of America, 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 22,301 (Oct. 25, 1985) (product market
was defined as the "cluster" of services offered by general acute care hospitals, the geographi-
cal market was the Chattanooga urban area). The United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit has just affirmed the FTC's Hospital Corp. of America decision. Hospital
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the largest for-profit hospital chains in the nation.3 7 This fact raises
the question of whether non-profit hospitals can be challenged under
section 7 of the Clayton Act. One commentator 8 has suggested that
section 7 should not apply to non-profit hospitals. Since the FTC has
jurisdiction only on asset acquisitions by corporations which are "or-
ganized to carry on business for [their] own profit or that of [their]
members,"3 9 a non-profit hospital should not be subject to attack
under section 7. Not only are "the interest of hospitals and its medi-
cal staff ... increasingly divergent,"' 0 but "'member' as used in
section 4, likely refers to members of the profit hospital corporation
itself, as opposed to members of the hospital's medical staff.""' Al-
though these seem to be good arguments for non-profit hospitals,
they only have academic relevance since section 1 and 2 of the Sher-
man Act apply to non-profit institutions. 2 Also, even if the FTC is
Corp. of America v. F.T.C., No. 85-3185, slip op. (7th Cir. Dec. 18, 1986).
Another case involving hospital mergers, United States v. National Medical Enterprises,
Inc., 1985-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 66,719 was dismissed with prejudice prior to any decision on
this issue due to alleged misconduct of government attorneys. On August 23, 1986, however,
the Ninth Circuit vacated the dismissal of the action, and remanded the case to the district
court directing the judge to reconsider the decision. See 51 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP.
(BNA) No. 1272 at 5 (July 3, 1986) for a summary of the Court of Appeals decision.
37. Humana, 445 F. Supp. at 607.
38. See Miles, infra note 53 at 261.
39. Miles, infra, note 53 at 261 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 44 (1976)) (emphasis in original).
40. Miles, infra note 53, at 261-62.
41. Id. at 262. The section 4 referred to in the quote is that of the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act. 15 U.S.C. § 44 (1976).
42. Miles, infra note 53, at 262.
Compare the text with the following comments made by FTC Chairman Terry Calvani:
Commission review of hospital mergers raises a number of specialized juris-
dictional issues, stemming from the fact that many hospitals are non-profit
rather than profit-making organizations. At first glance this fact would not ap-
pear to affect matters, since mergers are judged under the Clayton Act, which
makes no distinction along those lines. See 15 U.S.C. 18. The Commission's
power to seek a preliminary injunction, however, is conferred by 15 U.S.C.
53(b), which refers to threatened violations of the law by "any person, partner-
ship, or corporation." This language parallels that used in Section 5 of the FTC
Act, rather than that used in the Clayton Act. "Corporation" is defined in the
FTC Act to include any entity or association "which is organized to carry on
business for its own profit or that of its members." See 15 U.S.C. 44. This lan-
guage appears to exclude non-profit corporation from the FTC Act. Cf. Commu-
nity Blood Bank v. FTC, 405 F.2d 1011 (8th Cir. 1969). Section 53(b) is a part
of the FTC Act. Hence it could be argued that the FTC has no power to seek an
injunction against a merger involving a non-profit hospital. This argument prob-
ably reads too much into the form of words that Congress selected in drafting
Section 53(b), however. That section was added in 1973, much later than the
original FTC Act. The overall purpose of the section was to enhance the Com-
mission's enforcement powers by empowering it to seek injunctions. Thus the
better interpretation is that Section 53(b) is comparable in scope to the substan-
tive provisions, in this case those of the Clayton Act, against whose violation the
injunction is sought.
Competition in Health Care-FTC Views, TRADE REG. REP. 50,479 at 56,277 n. 15.
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not allowed to sue, there is always the possibility that the Justice
Department will challenge the action undertaken by the companies.
A more interesting issue is whether a hospital management cor-
poration that operates a hospital can be challenged under the anti-
trust laws. It has been suggested that management contracts should
be subject to attack. They are a form of asset acquisition because
they have value.43 Indeed this was at issue in the case of In re Hos-
pital Corp. of America." In this case the Commission held that
"treating the two managed hospitals as entities completely indepen-
dent of HCA is contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence
. . . ."4 The rationale was that the management contracts "provide
that HCA as manager is responsible for the day-to-day operation of
the facilities, and is charged with making recommendations to the
boards regarding virtually all aspects of the institutional opera-
tion."46 Since these management contracts enhance the opportunities
for collusion between managed and owned hospitals, the Commis-
sioner held that the acquisition of a "management contract that may
substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly violates
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act independently of a
violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act."""
It may be argued that in the case of a management contract
which gives the right to operate a public hospital, the fact that the
In Hospital Corp. of America v. F.T.C., Judge Posner stated that "[t]here is a possible
gap in the FTC's jurisdiction over acquisitions involving non-profit corporation, compare 15
U.S.C. 18 with 15 U.S.C. 44, 45(l)(2), but it doesn't affect this case, since the acquired and
acquiring firms are all proprietary." Hospital Corp. of America v. F.T.C., No. 85-3185, slip
op. at 14 (7th Cir. Dec. 18, 1986).
43. Id. at 263-64.
44. 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 22301 (Oct. 25, 1985).
45. Id. at 23, 338.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 23, 341. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, af-
firming the FTC's decision, stated with regard to the treatment of managed hospitals:
The aquisitions reduced the number of competing hospitals in the Chatta-
nooga market from I I to 7. True, this calculation assumes that the hospitals that
came under the management although not ownership of Hospital Corporation
should be considered allies rather than competitors of Hospital Corporation; the
Commission was entitled to so conclude. The manager (Hospital Corporation)
sets the prices charged by the managed hospitals, just as it sets its own prices.
Although the pricing and other decisions that it makes in its management role
are subject to the ultimate control of the board of directors of the managed
hospitals there is substantial evidence that the board usually defers to the man-
ager's decisions. If it were not inclined to defer, it would not have a management
contract; it would do its own managing, through officers hired by it. A hospital
managed by Hospital Corporation is therefore unlikely to engage in vigorous or
perhaps in any price competition with Hospital Corporation - or so at least the
Commission was entitled to conclude.
Hospital Corp. of America v. F.T.C., No. 85-3185, slip op. at 7-8 (7th Cir. Dec. 18, 1986).
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contract is considered an asset acquisition should be irrelevant be-
cause the hospital management corporation can raise the affirmative
defense of "state action." 8 Of course, the hospital corporation must,
in general terms, make sure that there is state supervision of the
activity and also show that there is an articulated state policy behind
the arrangement.4 9
A. "In any line of commerce."
Since for-profit and non-profit hospitals, as well as a hospital
corporation that can not show a "state action" exemption may be
subject to attack, they must measure the relevant market to see the
effect that their transaction may have on competition.
1. The "cluster" approach.-The courts have held that the
relevant product market in the merger of acute care hospitals is the
"cluster" of services offered by those hospitals." In Philadelphia
National Bank the Court utilized a "cluster" approach to define the
market. Under this approach the product market is considered the
"cluster" or conglomeration of services when such "cluster of prod-
48. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
49. For example, there is a law in the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico that provides as
follows:
§ 337. Legislative purpose
It is the purpose of this chapter to promote a higher efficient administration
and operation of health facilities and services ....
Said Administration shall have the powers necessary to administer and op-
erate the facilities for health protection and care ....
§ 337d. General Powers
The Administration shall have . . . the powers to:
(h) Contract or in any other form agree with public or private bodies . . .
to offer administrative and technical services which will tend to hasten the oper-
ation of its facilities.
Negotiate and execute all kinds of contracts and other public instruments
with persons, firms, corporations .....
(v) Negotiate when it deems it pertinent, the operation, administration, and
maintenance of governmental hospitals as community hospitals.
P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 24 §§ 337, 337d (1979) (emphasis added). Based on this law, the
Secretary of Health of Puerto Rico can negotiate the operation of public hospitals as commu-
nity hospitals managed by for-profit companies. The argument suggested in the paper is that if
the private company is sued when it enters into a merger with another hospital, the company
can avoid the inclusion of the public hospital in the market, thereby reducing its market share.
The argument will be based on the "state action" exemption. Generally, the company will
argue that when it received the operation of the public hospital there was a state policy (as
shown in § 337) and that the state supervises the activity.
50. American Medicorp v. Humana, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 589 (E.D. Pa. 1977). See also In
re American Medical Int'l Inc., 104 F.T.C. 177, 193 (1984).
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uct and services . . . has economic significance well beyond the vari-
ous products or services involved." 51 In Philadelphia National Bank,
the Court determined that the product market was the "cluster" of
products and services which it denoted "commercial banking." The
Court included in the "cluster" such services as checking accounts
and trust administration because, as the Court stated, "they are en-
tirely free of effective competition from products or services of oiher
financial institutions.15 2 This approach of considering as a separate
product market the group of services offered by commercial banks
had the effect of excluding as competitors those other financial insti-
tutions that did not, or could not, provide all the services that were
included in the "cluster." Freestanding emergency units and other
health care providers will not be considered competitors of hospitals
because they do not provide all the services that are provided in the
cluster.53
By utilizing this "cluster" approach in the hospital cases, courts
are less analytical. Courts tend to avoid the use of the concept of
"cross elasticity" of demand, which is the approach generally used
by courts in the analysis of other industries. The cross elasticity of
demand analysis would require asking what the reaction of patients
would be to price changes. The effect of this approach is to exclude
from the market non-hospital providers that in fact may constrain
the market power of a hospital.
This unique "cluster" of services approach utilized in the bank
cases was one of the main arguments in American Medicorp v.
Humana, Inc.54 In Humana, the first case to challenge a hospital
acquisition, American Medicorp instituted a complaint challenging
Humana's proposed tender offer as violative of section 7 of the Clay-
ton Act. The plaintiff argued that the relevant product market was
either:
1. The development of hospitals by proprietary chains, 55 or
2. The activities of major proprietary chains because the indus-
try recognizes proprietary chains as separate lines of commerce and
51. United States v. Phillipsburg Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 399 U.S. 350, 361 (1970).
52. United States v. Philadelphia Nat. Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 356 (1962) (emphasis
added).
53. On this point, see Miles, Hospital Mergers and Antitrust Laws: An Overview, 29
ANTITRUST BULL. 253, 279 (1984); Sims & McDonald, Defining Product and Geographical
Markets in Health Care Cases, Joint Program on Competition, Economic Change and Anti-
trust Issues in the Health Care Industry - A.B.A. - Feb. 2-4, 1984.
54. American Medicorp v. Humana, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 589 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
55. Id. at 596.
91 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW WINTER 1986
they offer a unique cluster of services to their customers.56
The district court did not accept any of the plaintiff's theories.
As to the theory that the development of hospitals by proprietary
chains constituted a line of commerce, the court noted that
"[n]either Humana nor Medicorp is interested in a project unless it
will ultimately control all phases of operations once the hospital is
completed. 57 Based on this statement the Court concluded that
since there was no buyer-seller transaction, because the hospital
chain corporation will operate what it develops, there could not be a
line of commerce. 8 This appears to be a reasonable conclusion be-
cause for-profit hospital management corporations are created with
the objective of operating hospitals to make a profit. It would be a
very unwise decision for a proprietary chain to develop a hospital
and then turn over its operation to one of its competitors.
The court considered the theory that the activities of the propri-
etary chains constituted a unique "cluster" of services. It concluded,
however, that the facts plaintiff alleged were not recognized in the
industry. The court noted that the fact that hospital chains were
members of the Federation of American Hospitals made no differ-
ence because membership in the Federation was based on the "ad-
mittedly arbitrary criterion that a firm owns three or more commu-
nity hospitals."" The court also concluded that the cluster of
development services was not unique. The court reached this conclu-
sion by an analogy to the bank cases. In the bank cases, commercial
banks had an actual competitive advantage over savings banks. Sav-
ings banks could only offer checking accounts to "persons who were
noncommercial users."60 The plaintiff in the Medicorp case could not
prove that "non-,profit systems of hospital owners and operators"
were unable to render the alleged unique cluster of development ser-
vices. 6' Instead of adopting either one of the plaintiff's theories, the
court concluded that the relevant product market was not the devel-
opment of hospitals but the delivery of acute care hospital services to
doctors and patients."
2. Factors to determine that the relevant product market is
the "cluster" of general acute care services.-The FTC first ad-
56. Id.
57. Id. at 598 (emphasis omitted).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 602.
60. Id. at 603.
61. Id. at 604.
62. Id. at 612.
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dressed the issue of whether the product market is the cluster of
general acute care hospital services in In re American Medical Inter-
national.6" In this case, American Medical International (AMI), the
third largest proprietary chain in the nation, acquired French Hospi-
tal. By reason of the acquisition, American Medical International
controlled the operation of three of the five hospitals in the county of
San Luis Obispo, California. Those five hospitals accounted for over
seventy percent of the total acute care hospital beds in the county.
American Medical International also controlled over seventy-nine
percent of the beds in the city of San Luis Obispo. The FTC alleged
that the acquisition was in violation of section 7 of the Clayton Act" '
and section 5 of the FTC Act. The Commission, upholding the initial
decision, held that AMI's acquisition of French Hospital violated
section 7 of the Clayton Act, and it ordered its divestiture of French
Hospital.
65
The Commission determined that the relevant product market
was the cluster of general acute care hospital services. AMI argued
that defining the product market as the cluster of general acute care
hospital services was not correct- because it was contrary to the idea
of reasonable interchangeability. According to AMI, the product
market should not only have included the services offered by general
acute care hospitals, but also should have included services rendered
by non-hospital providers. Defendants generally want a broader
product market in order to minimize the impact that their actions
may have on the relevant market. This was the approach taken by
AMI when it attempted to enlarge the relevant market in which its
acquisition was to be tested. AMI pointed out that there were vari-
ous non-hospital services that served as substitutes for services pro-
vided by French Hospital. Among those substitutes were clinics, phy-
sician's offices, and medical laboratories."
The arguments advanced by AMI against the "cluster" ap-
63. 104 F.T.C. 177 (1984).
64. See supra note 9.
65. On March 21, 1986, the FTC announced an order modifying a modified order to
cease and desist. Among other things this order allows AMI to retain a security interest in
French Hospital. If the hospital is reacquired under the security interest AMI must redivest.
See 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) % 22,342 (March 21, 1986). The resulting market shares after
the merger were as follows: (a) In the County of San Luis Obispo AMI increased its market
share based on patient days from 55.6 to 75.5% (3818 to 6025 in the H.H. Index). Based on
hospital gross revenues from 52.2 to 71.3% (3518 to 5507 in the H.H. Index). (b) In the city
of San Louis Obispo AMI increased its market share based on patient days from 57.8 to 87%
(4370 to 7775 in the H.H. Index). Based on hospital gross revenues from 53.3 to 82.4 (3996 to
7097 in the H.H. Index). 104 F.T.C. at 201 & nn. 12, 13.
66. 104 F.T.C. at 192.
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proach seemed to be in accord with the general principles of measur-
ing a product market. Alternatives to the product in question become
important to buyers when an increase in the price of the product
occurs. In this case, the patient is the buyer and the product is the
medical service that he requires. Assuming a price sensitive patient,
it appears reasonable to say that a very high price for the service of
a hospital emergency room will cause that patient to go to a free
standing emergency center that has lower fees. The same could be
argued concerning many of the services offered by hospitals. For ex-
ample, if a hospital charges twenty-five dollars for taking one x-ray,
the patient will probably go to a radiology center that charges him
less for the service. A medical laboratory is a more common exam-
ple. In terms of surgery, it could be argued that most surgery can
only be done in a hospital. Although this is true, many cities have
what is called ambulatory surgery centers in which minor surgery
can take place. All these examples show that it is very difficult to
deny the fact that there are non-hospital-provided services which
may serve as substitutes for those services provided in hospitals.
However, in AMI, the Commission refuted the argument of rea-
sonable interchangeability by an analogy to the Philadelphia Na-
tional Bank case.67 The Commission stated that the District Court in
Philadelphia National Bank concluded that "commercial banking,
viewed collectively has sufficient peculiar characteristics which ne-
gate reasonable interchangeability."6 8 The Commission said that the
cluster of hospital services also negates reasonable interchangeability
because, as in the bank cases, the conglomeration of the services
makes them a unique product. The Commission stated:
Although each individual service that comprises the cluster of
general acute care hospital services may well have outpatient
substitutes, the benefit that accrues to patient and physician is
derived from their complementarity. There is no readily availa-
ble substitute supplier of the benefit that this complementarity
confers on patient and physician."
Besides looking at the complementarity of the individual ser-
vices that are provided by general acute care hospitals, the Commis-
sion considered the following factors in determining that the product
market was the cluster of general acute care hospital services: (1)
67. Id. at 193-94.
68. Id. at 194 (quoting from Philadelphia National Bank 201 F. Supp. 348, 363 (E.D.
Pa. 1962)) (emphasis added).
69. 104 F.T.C. at 194 (emphasis added).
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the uniqueness of the service or equipment provided; (2) the unique-
ness of the cluster of services provided by the general acute care
hospital; (3) the low cross-elasticity of supply; and (4) its recognition
as a separate market.
70
In terms of the uniqueness of the services available in general
acute care hospitals, the Commission noted that there was a law in
California which required that medical, nursing, surgical, anesthesia,
laboratory, radiology, pharmacy and dietary services be offered by
hospitals on a 24-hour basis. 71 This is one of the strongest arguments
in favor of finding the product market to be a "cluster" of services.
It is difficult to imagine a non-hospital provider that will offer all of
the above mentioned services. Even assuming that all those services
are in fact offered by a number of non-hospital providers, those prov-
iders would probably not be open on a 24-hour basis (with the excep-
tion of the pharmacy). Concerning the unique services or equipment
provided by hospitals, the Commission stated that there "are no free
standing surgical or emergency room facilities in the area."'7' The
Commission, in effect, was willing to find that the services were
unique only because no free standing surgical or emergency facilities
existed in the area. This may be used in future cases to argue that
the services are not, in fact, unique and thus, that the cluster ap-
proach is not appropriate in hospital mergers. It may be argued that
in considering the availability in AMI, the Commission has conceded
that free standing emergency facilities affect the issue of whether a
hospital service is unique.
Cross-elasticity of supply is a more difficult consideration for
proponents of hospital mergers to combat. Since entry into the mar-
ket by suppliers is difficult because of the requirement of Certificates
of Need, hospitals are in a position to raise prices without encounter-
ing immediate competition. For example, if a hospital raises the
price of one of its services, a hospital management company cannot
go and build a facility or expand its existing facilities without a Cer-
tificate of Need.
Finally, the courts will take into account the industry partici-
70. Id. at 193.
71. Id. As to the uniqueness of the cluster of services provided by general acute care
hospitals the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has stated that "although hospitals increasingly
are providing services on an out-patient basis, thus competing with non-hospital providers of
the same service (tests, minor surgical procedures, etc.), most hospital services cannot be pro-
vided by non-hospital providers; as to these, hospitals have no competition from other provid-
ers of medical care." Hospital Corp. of America v. F.T.C., No. 85-8135, slip op. at 10 (7th
Cir. Dec. 18, 1978) (emphasis added).
72. Id.
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pants' recognition of hospitals as a separate class apart from non-
hospital providers. It is interesting to note that the hospital adminis-
trators' and owners' own comments are being used by the FTC to
find a narrower product market. The Commission has said that the
services offered by non-hospital providers were not considered substi-
tutes of the complementarity of hospital services because, among
other things, "those in the market only recognized other hospitals,
not suppliers of individual services, as their competitors. 73
All of the above mentioned factors used by the Commission to
determine the product market are certainly relevant. It seems, how-
ever, that the Commission used general statements in its decision
without thoroughly analyzing any specific factor. For example, when
the Commission said that the cross-elasticity of supply is low, it sup-
ported the argument by saying that there are requirements imposed
on market entry. It did not mention the possibility that if a hospital
raises its prices, other non-hospital providers already in the market
may render more services in order to attract price sensitive patients.
Although it is true, as was pointed out in the initial opinion of the
AMI case, that there are no substitutes that could offer all of the
hospital services, there are certainly many providers that collectively
may be able to offer almost all of the services rendered by a hospi-
tal.74 It is difficult to negate the fact that the sum of the services
rendered by non-hospital providers is a force that restricts the ability
of a hospital to utilize monopoly power in the market. Therefore, it
follows that non-hospital providers should be considered competitors
of hospitals and their services should be included in the product mar-
ket. Enforcement agencies have continued to adhere to the definition
of the product market as the "cluster" of general acute care hospital
services.75
3. Indications from Hospital Corp. of America.-The most
recent case decided by the Commission on this issue is In re Hospi-
73. Id. at 194.
74. Proger, The Unique Analytical Problems Presented by Hospitals and other Provid-
ers Mergers and Horizontal Integrations, Joint Program on Competition, Economic Change,
and Antitrust Issues in the Health Care Industry; A.B.A. (Feb. 2-4, 1984).
75. For instance, on October 31, 1983, the Department of Justice filed an action against
National Medical Enterprises, Inc., alleging that the acquisition of a hospital in Modesto,
California by National Medical Enterprises "increased concentration in the provision of prod-
ucts and services by general acute care hospitals in the Modesto area." United States v. Na-
tional Medical Enterprises, Inc., 4 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 1 45,083 at 53,637-3 (Oct. 31,
1983). This case was dismissed with prejudice, and the dismissal was reversed by the Ninth
Circuit. See supra, note 36.
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tal Corporation of America." This case involved the acquisition by
Hospital Corporation of America, the largest hospital chain in the
United States, of a number of hospitals in the urban Chattanooga,
Tennessee area. 7 The importance of this case cannot be underesti-
mated. The Commission accepted the findings in the initial decision
which held that the relevant product market was the cluster of ser-
vices offered by acute care hospitals, including outpatient as well as
inpatient care.78 The Commission made it clear, however, that it was
accepting this definition of the product market only because the defi-
nition was not appealed by either respondent or complaint counsel.7 9
Even though the Commission accepted this determination, it ac-
knowledged that there was evidence supporting the idea that "free-
standing outpatient facilities compete with hospitals for many outpa-
tients."80 The Commission also recognized that there was evidence to
support a finding that "hospitals offer and inpatients consume a clus-
ter of services that bears little relation to outpatient care."81
Although the Commission did not make a de novo determina-
tion of the product market, it did state in dicta that the definition of
the product market in hospital cases will vary with each case. Thus,
it is not now clear that every time there is a hospital merger the
product market will be the cluster of general acute care hospital ser-
vices to the exclusion of outpatient substitutes, as was the case in
AML As the Commission stated:
76. 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 1 22,301 (Oct. 25, 1985).
77. Hospital Corporation of America, ("HCA"), acquired Hospital Affiliates Interna-
tional ("HAl") which owned or managed five hospitals in the Chattanooga area and Health
Care Corporation ("HCC") which owned one hospital in the same area. See Hospital Corp. of
America, 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 22,301 at 23,327-28 (1985). HCC already had one
hospital in the area. The consequences of these acquisitions were to give HCA control of five
out of eleven hospitals in the Chattanooga urban area and of seven out of fourteen hospitals in
the Chattanooga Metropolitan Statistical area. Id. As will be explained below, the Commission
decided that the relevant geographical area was the Chattanooga urban area. See infra note
116 and accompanying text.
78. 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 22,301 at 23,333.
79. Id. The Commission was also aware that in this particular case the definition of the
product market was not critical. It stated:
In this case, the product market issue would unlikely be outcome-determi-
native. First, even if the outpatient services of non-hospital providers were in-
cluded in the market, HCA concedes that their inclusion would not greatly af-
fect hospital market shares. Thus, it seems safe to conclude that adding such
services to the relevant product market would add little to the analysis in this
case. Second, both measures of inpatient market power and measures that in-
clude hospital outpatient services provide the same basis for liability in this case.
Thus, excluding outpatient care from the market would add little to the analysis.
Id. at 23,335 n.6 (citations omitted).
80. Id. at 23,333.
81. Id.
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In American Medical International, Inc.. . . we defined the rel-
evant product market as the 'cluster of general acute care hospi-
tal services' to the exclusion of outpatient substitutes for individ-
ual services that comprise the cluster, since the 'benefit that
accrues to patient and physician' is derived from the comple-
mentarity of those services. It may well be that in this case the
proper product market excludes all outpatient care; perhaps out-
patient care should be a separate relevant market or markets.8 2
Clearly, there is a possibility of a product market which excludes all
outpatient care. In other words, outpatient facilities of hospitals will
be excluded from the definition, although separate markets with this
factor may also come into play. Hospital counsel should analyze the
consequences of future acquisitions by applying not only the defini-
tion of product market used in AMI, but also by examining a prod-
uct market that excludes outpatients' hospital services.
4. Differences in hospitals that may be relevant in determin-
ing the exclusion of some hospitals from the market.-When there
is a merger of two hospitals, the services that are rendered by non-
hospital providers are not included in the product market. This does
not mean, however, that every time there is a hospital merger, all the
hospitals in the area will be included in the market. This subsection
will address the issue of which hospitals are included in the market
when there is a merger of two hospitals.
In United States v. Hospital Affiliates International, Inc.,83 the
United States challenged the acquisition of DePaul Hospital in New
Orleans by Hospital Affiliates. The complaint alleged violations of
section 7 of the Clayton Act and section 2 of the Sherman Act. The
interesting aspect of this case was that it involved the merger of psy-
chiatric hospitals. The district court decided that the relevant prod-
uct market was in-patient psychiatric care by private psychiatric
hospitals and non-governmental general acute care hospitals in the
area. The court excluded state owned psychiatric hospitals and gen-
eral hospitals with psychiatric units from the definition of the prod-
uct market. The court excluded these hospitals because they differed
from private psychiatric hospitals in quality, length of care, types of
treatment available, and staffing arrangements. 4 It also noted that
the staffing arrangement in government-owned psychiatric hospitals
82. Id.
83. 1980-81 Trade Case. (CCH) 63,721 (1980).
84. Id. at 77852.
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was closed staff, "meaning that the psychiatrists are employees of
the hospital." ' This was contrasted with the open staff arrangement
in private psychiatric hospitals. In discussing general hospitals with
psychiatric units, the court noted that those hospitals "emphasize
relatively short-term care and practice resolution and ordinarily do
not have the variety of programs or the space for recreation and
group therapy usually found in private psychiatric hospitals.""
5. Other criteria-1984 Merger Guidelines.8 7 -The Merger
Guidelines are a statement of policy issued by the Justice Depart-
ment. Since they are only a policy statement and do not have the
force of law, the courts are not bound to follow them. The 1984
Merger Guidelines represent a change in the Department policy to-
wards a more sophisticated economic analysis. Under this analysis
the market will be defined in terms of hypothetical price increases. 8
Accordingly, the Department will analyze the product market
by taking "each product . . . produced or sold by each merging firm
and ask what would happen if a hypothetical monopolist of that
product imposed a 'small but significant and nontransitory' increase
in price." 89 If the consequence of the price increase is that buyers
will purchase another product, then that product will be included in
the market together with the first one. The Department will continue
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. U.S. Department of Justice Merger Guidelines, 49 FED. REG. 26827-37 (1984). See
generally A Symposium on the 1984 Department of Justice Merger Guidelines, 29 ANTI-
TRUST BULL. 613 (1984).
88. The first Merger Guidelines appeared in 1968. 2 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH), 1 4510
at 6881-21 (1982). The 1968 Merger Guidelines approach the product market by utilizing the
concept of "reasonable interchangeability of use." This approach of the 1968 Guidelines was
revised by the Justice Department in 1982 and most recently in January 1984. 2 TRADE REG.
REP. (CCH), 1 4490 (1984 Guidelines). The Department defines a market as:
a product or group of products and a geographical area in which it is sold
such that a hypothetical, profit-maximizing firm, not subject to price regulation,
that was the only present and future seller of those products in that area, would
impose a 'small but significant and non-transitory' increase in price above pre-
vailing or likely future levels.
2 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 4490 at 6879-8.
This definition of the market indicates that the Department is inclined towards a more
dynamic analysis in determining the components of a market. The FTC will probably initiate
suit against a hospital if an analysis under the guidelines suggests that there is a violation of
the antitrust laws. Although the guidelines are the policy statement of the Justice Department,
the FTC has stated that it agrees with the approach taken by the guidelines. See Statement of
the Federal Trade Commission Concerning Horizontal Mergers, reprinted in TRADE REG.
REP. (CCH) No. 546 (June 16, 1982).
89. U.S. Department of Justice Merger Guidelines, 2 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) T 4492
at 6879-9. The price increase will generally be a five percent rise in price. In addition, the
Department will assume that buyers are aware of the price changes. Notice that this statement
runs against the argument in health care that patients are price-insensitive.
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with this analysis "until a group of products is identified for which a
hypothetical monopolist could profitably impose a 'small but signifi-
cant and nontransitory' increase in price." 90 The relevant evidence
that the Department will consider to see the effect of the price in-
crease will be: "(1) Evidence of buyers' perceptions that the products
are or are not substitutes . . .; (2) [S]imilarities in price movements
...that are not explainable by common or parallel changes in fac-
tors such as cost of inputs, income, or other variables; (3) Similari-
ties or differences between the products . . .; and (4) [S]ellers' per-
ceptions that the products are or are not substitutes ....
Finally, the Department will take into account production substitu-
tion, or as it is known in economic terms, cross-elasticity of supply.9"
If the above-mentioned standards are applied to the hospital in-
dustry, the final result will probably be the same as the result
achieved by the courts and the Commission. The interesting point is
that, although the result is the same, the guidelines appear, at first
glance, to be less rigorous where hospitals are concerned than the
analysis undertaken by the courts. For example, the guidelines will
begin the analysis by taking each product of the merging firms and
asking what will happen if there is an increase in price. This ap-
proach of trying to determine the substitutes of each of the products
is inconsistent with the applicability of a "cluster approach."' 3 This
interpretation of the guidelines will favor the inclusion of non-hospi-
tal providers in the relevant market by including them as substitutes
for some of the services offered by hospitals. Hospitals will again
argue that non-hospital providers should be included in the market
because they do provide substitute services.
Regardless of whether the guidelines appear favorable, hospitals
will still have to prove that the effect of the price increase will cause
a patient to choose another provider of services. Hospitals will gener-
ally have difficulty proving the effect of a price rise by using the
factors enunciated in the guidelines. As to the "[b]uyers' perceptions
that the products are or are not substitutes," patients usually do not
attempt to determine what medical services they are going to use.
Most of the time it is the physician who makes the decision concern-
ing the services or brands of medicines that the patient will use. Pa-
tients lack the information needed to differentiate between services
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Other factors such as durable goods are not discussed in the article because they are
not applicable to the hospital industry.
93. This interpretation has been suggested by Miles, supra note 53.
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offered by a hospital from those offered by other providers. 94
Whether a physician will consider a service offered by a free-stand-
ing clinic to be a substitute for the same service offered by a hospital
will depend on the particular characteristics of the two services. Cer-
tainly, if the service is one that is not usually provided on an outpa-
tient basis then the physician will probably exclude the services of
non-hospital providers.
In terms of the differences or similarities of price movements,
the hospital may be able to include other providers in the market if
it can show that the costs of the services are the same whether they
are provided by a hospital or a non-hospital provider. This is the
probable result because similarity of prices indicates that the services
can be substituted for each other. A competitive market will tend to
stabilize the prices of substitute products. If a company lowers its
prices, its competitors will be willing to reduce their prices in order
to avoid a shift of buyers.
Concerning the similarities or differences between the products,
hospitals will have difficulty arguing that the services offered by non-
hospital providers are similar. The mere fact that a service is per-
formed in a hospital may give it special advantages over the same
service at another institution. The hospital must overcome the argu-
ment that hospital services are unique because they have economic
significance as a group. In essence, to overcome the "cluster" ap-
proach in terms of evidence regarding the perception of the sellers,
hospitals will have a hard time trying to prove that non-hospital
providers are their competitors. As in AMI, 5 plaintiffs thus far have
been able to obtain documents from the hospitals that express their
view that only other hospitals are competitors. Finally, as to produc-
tion substitution - the ability of some firms to use the same produc-
tion facilities to provide another product - hospitals will also have
problems including competitors in the market since there are entry
barriers to the market, such as Certificates of Need.
Even if the courts refuse to use a cluster approach and utilize
the Guidelines, the result will probably be the same. Thus, the alter-
native of using a Guidelines approach still does not help hospitals,
although it is more fair. Furthermore, even if the courts accept the
argument that the guidelines reject the "cluster" approach by trying
94. AMI argued that "patients lack price information that is needed to make choices
about their care and instead rely on their physician, who is no more price sensitive than the
patient." In re American Medical Int'l, Inc., 104 F.T.C. 177, 179 (1984).
95. Id. at 197-98.
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to find the substitutes of each product, and assuming that the guide-
lines have the force of law, the results will probably be the same.
The Justice Department would argue that the cluster of general
acute care hospital services is one product because it is unique. In
addition, it would argue that adding non-hospital providers to the
market will not change the tendencies of a hypothetical hospital mo-
nopolist to raise prices. The hospital providers would be unable to
offer the collection of services offered by the hospital which arguably
is one product. In essence, the Department will say that the cluster is
a "new product"9 6 which can only be offered by hospitals. Therefore,
the end result of using the guidelines will be the same as an analysis
utilizing current merger theories; general acute care hospital services
will be found to be the relevant product market.
From the preceding comments it can be expected that the hospi-
tal industry will have difficulty accomplishing its goal of broadening
the product market. Thus, it seems that in terms of the product mar-
ket definition, courts will keep using a "cluster" approach. The main
reasons for this argument follow. First, it is not easy to use an eco-
nomic analysis to determine the product market. For example, it is
nearly impossible to determine what the patient's reaction will be to
a price increase. The difficulty with this question is that it should be
asked for each service that the hospitals provide. Therefore, it is not
surprising that courts tend to avoid the use of this particular eco-
nomic analysis. Second, courts lack expertise in the hospital industry
and, thus, wish to avoid getting into an elaborate inquiry. Finally, as
demonstrated by the analysis of the Guidelines, courts prefer the use
of the "cluster" approach since the alternative to using the Guide-
lines will almost always define the market in the same way as the
"cluster" approach, but it entails a more elaborate inquiry.
The result indicates that perhaps a narrow product market is
the price hospital owners must pay for being part of an industry that
has many characteristics which do not reflect competition. One way
that hospital owners can reduce the cost of a narrow market is by
measuring it by the "cluster" approach as well as by the Guidelines
approach before entering into any merger agreement . 7 Counsel
should also be aware of the possibility of the creation of separate
markets, as was suggested in the Hospital Corporation of America
96. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
97. Another factor that may be influencing the courts in using a strict approach is the
merger trend in the hospital industry. For example, after the suit was initiated, AMI acquired
Lifemark Corporation which is a 25-hospital chain. In re American Medical Int'l, Inc., 104
F.T.C. at 231 (Statement of Comm. Bailey concurring in part and dissenting in part).
MERGER OF HOSPITALS
case.98
B. In any "Section" of the Country
The second part of an analysis of the relevant market is to mea-
sure the relevant geographical market. This subsection of the article
will discuss the general factors that the FTC is using in its analysis
of the geographical market in the merger of hospitals.
1. The "practicability" approach.-In AMI the Commission
indicated that in defining the geographical market in the merger of
hospitals it would follow the general pragmatic approach used by the
Supreme Court in Brown Shoe in which the market must "'corre-
spond to the commercial realities' of the industry and be economi-
cally significant. '"99 Courts will generally look at the area where "the
seller operates, and to which purchasers can particularly turn for
supplies." 100 Based on these factors, the Commission determined that
the relevant geographical areas were San Luis Obispo County and
the City of San Luis Obispo. This finding was adverse to the allega-
tions of the hospital corporation that five Santa Barbara hospitals
and two Santa Maria hospitals were part of the geographical mar-
ket. The Commission considered patient inflow and outmigration sta-
tistics, physicians' location, and industry recognition in determining
the relevant geographical area.
2. Patient inflow and outmigration statistics.-In analyzing
the boundaries of the geographical market the Commission adopted
what is known as the "Elzinga-Hogarty" test. Under this test, the
courts consider the area in which the hospital in question is located
as a starting point and then determine the percentage of patients
from that area that use hospital services outside of that area (out-
migration). Courts also determine the percentage of patients from
other areas that come to the area of the hospital in question to get
hospital services (inflow). 101 If the inflow and outmigration percent-
ages are low, then it is probable that the initial area selected is the
relevant geographical area. If the percentages are high, however,
then the geographical area should be broadened.
98. 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 22301 at 23,333. See also discussion supra notes 77-
83 and accompanying text.
99. 104 F.T.C. at 194 (quoting from Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294,
336-37 (1962)).
100. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
101. Elzinga & Hogarty, The Problem of Geographical Market Delineation in An-
timerger Suits, 18 ANTITRUST BULL. 45 (1973).
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Utilizing this factor, the Commission concluded that San Luis
Obispo County was one geographical market because of the low in-
flow and outmigration percentages in the county area. In terms of
inflow statistics, the Commission found that "over 90% of the per-
sons hospitalized in the five county hospitals were residents of San
Luis Obispo County. ' 10 2 The Commission recognized that outmigra-
tion statistics were less certain. It found that "the incidence of out-
migration ranged from as low as 5% (estimated by MCHSA) to as
much as 14.5% of county residents (estimated for Medicare pur-
poses)."10 8 In terms of the narrower geographical market, the City of
San Luis Obispo, the Commission upheld the findings of the admin-
istrative law judge that "residents of the city and environs go almost
exclusively to hospitals located within the city."104
AMI's attempt to show higher percentages was unsuccessful.
The Commission did not give much weight to the statistics presented
by AMI, primarily because they were prepared specifically for trial.
The Medicare and Medi-Cal estimates were not prepared for trial
and, thus, were considered more credible. 10 5 In addition, the Com-
mission rejected AMI's argument that the city was not an appropri-
ate geographical market because many patients treated in hospitals
within the city had come from "sections of the county outside of the
city boundaries."'10 In order to approach this argument, the Com-
mission utilized the "practicability" approach. It said that the fact
that some patients go to the city to get services does not necessarily
mean that hospitals outside the city compete with those in the city
area. The reasoning behind this proposition is troublesome. The
Commission stated that some hospitals outside the city limits did not
provide a number of services that were provided by hospitals in the
city, and that therefore, they did not compete. The problem with this
conclusion is that the courts cannot really determine if the patients
that go to the hospitals in the city do so because of services only
offered by those hospitals, or if they do so for some other reason.
The use of the "Elzinga-Hogarty" test as a factor in the analy-
sis of hospital merger was not a novel approach."0 7 The district court
in Hospital Affiliates appears to have used this approach to conclude
102. 104 F.T.C. at 195.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 196.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. In Hospital Corp. of America, 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 22,301 at 22,334 n. 7,
the Commission explained the way in which the Elzigna & Hogarty test operates.
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that the relevant geographical market was New Orleans and its
surroundings.
Although the use of the "Elzinga-Hogarty" test was not
favorable to AMI, it is the best approach because it takes into ac-
count what the patients actually do. Contrary to the "cluster" ap-
proach in product market analysis, it looks at where patients actually
turn for services.
3. Physician's Location.-In Hospital Affiliates, the district
court relied on the location of the offices of the psychiatrists among
other things to determine the relevant geographical market. Since
the majority of the offices were within ten miles of New Orleans, the
court held that New Orleans and its surrounding areas were the rele-
vant market. The court, however, as in the case of patient origin
statistics, did not discuss its reasoning. Fortunately, the AMI deci-
sion does shed some light on this matter.
In AMI, the Commission concluded that since 98% of the pa-
tient admissions to French, Sierra Vista, and San Luis Obispo Gen-
eral hospitals were by physicians located in the City of San Luis
Obispo, the city then constituted a relevant geographical market.108
This indicates that the Commission is not only looking at the area
where "[patients] can particularly turn for [services]" but also at the
area where physicians can particularly send their patients. Because
of the special characteristics of the hospital industry, it is necessary
to focus on the physicians who are not really the purchasers. Most
patients lack the information to make a decision concerning where to
go for medical services. The patient's doctor then, acts, in practical
terms, as the agent of the patient in making the decision. Hospitals
are well aware of this fact. Hospitals, therefore, as indicated in AMI,
"compete for physicians in order to increase admissions."109 If hospi-
tals compete for physicians, then the city will probably be a relevant
geographical market. 110 In other words, if hospitals compete for phy-
sicians within a certain area, then that area must be the same one in
which they compete for patients because physicians are the agents of
108. 104 F.T.C. at 197.
109. Id. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has also acknowl-
edged the role of the physician as agent of the patient. The Court stated that "[gloing to
another city is out of the question in medical emergencies; and even when an operation or
some other hospital service can be deferred, the patient's doctor will not (at least not for
reasons of price) send the patient to another city, where the doctor is unlikely to have hospital
privileges." Hospital Corp. of America v. F.T.C., No. 85-3185, slip op. at 10 (7th Cir. Dec.
18, 1986) (emphasis added).
I10. The Commission found 98% of the patients admitted to the three hospitals were
referred by physicians located within the city. Id.
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their patients. Furthermore, the AMI case indicates that physicians
usually refer their patients to the closest hospital in order to avoid
the inconvenience of treating patients in hospitals that are some dis-
tance from their practice. Thus, if most physicians are concentrated
in one area, that area will have economic significance as a geograph-
ical market. Finally, not only the area where the patients live or
where the doctors are located will be relevant. The area where the
hospitals are located may indicate a geographical market. For exam-
ple, in Hospital Affiliates, the court noted that the fact that "all
licensed psychiatric facilities are also within ten (10) miles from
New Orleans" '111 indicates that New Orleans and its surrounding ar-
eas are the relevant geographical market.
Similar to patient statistics, hospital chains will have difficulty
countering the physicians' location and referrals statistics that a
plaintiff will bring to the attention of the court because they are
static in nature. The approach, however, of looking at a physician's
location seems to be a correct one because, as in the case of the
"Elzinga-Hogarty" test, it explores what the patients will do by look-
ing at what their physicians do.
4. Industry Recognition.-The final factor considered by the
Commission was the recognition in the hospital industry of the City
of San Luis Obispo and its surroundings as the relevant geographical
market. The Commission, in its decision, used the same words as the
members of the industry to support the finding of a narrow relevant
geographical market. Certainly, it is very persuasive for the record to
contain statements by hospital officials in which they recognize that
the market is a narrow one. For example, what could be more per-
suasive evidence than a statement of a hospital's Vice President indi-
cating that hospitals in the city of San Luis Obispo are not in com-
petition with those outside the city boundaries? Evidence of this
nature was presented in the AMI case.'
12
5. Indications from Hospital Corp. of America.-In the case
Ill. 1980-81 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 63,721 at 77,853.
112. AMI's Vice President said:
It is important to reiterate that our findings clearly pointed to the fact there
is no definable competition for Arroyo Grande Community Hospital. The hospi-
tals south of Arroyo Grande are geographically located too far away to be com-
petition and the facilities, Sierra Vista and French County, in the north likewise
are geographically too far away to be considered direct competition.
104 F.T.C. at 197-98.
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of Hospital Corp. of America, s the complaint counsel agreed with
the respondent that the Chattanooga urban area was an appropriate
market "within which to assess the competitive effects of' 1 4 the ac-
quisitions. Complaint counsel argued, however, that "a much more
appropriate geographic market is the federally designated Metropoli-
tan Statistical Area ... ."6 Since complaint counsel had conceded
that the Chattanooga urban area was an appropriate market, the
Commission analyzed the effect on competition in such a market.1 6
The important aspect of the case is that the Commission agreed with
the complaint counsel's criticism of the evidence offered by HCA in
support of its definition of the market. The Commission stated:
"HCA offered a static picture of the market without offering evi-
dence or argument considering the likelihood or unlikelihood that
physicians and their patients in Chattanooga would travel to outlying
hospitals in the event of an exercise of market power by Chatta-
nooga urban area hospitals."' 1
7
In this case, the Commission's emphasis on and preference for
the use of a dynamic approach is evident." 8 An examination of "po-
tential competitive responses to the current market picture"119 is
thus essential.
6. Other criteria-1984 Merger Guidelines.-The Justice De-
partment's 1984 merger guidelines approach to defining the geo-
graphic market parallels their approach in defining the relevant
product market. In essence the Department will measure the area in
which a hypothetical firm could raise prices profitably above compet-
itive levels.' 20
113. 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 1 22,301 (Oct. 25, 1985).
114. Id. at 23,337.
115. Id. at 23,335.
116. Id. at 23,337.
117. Id. (emphasis added).
118. The Commission is thus taking a more dynamic analysis in approaching the prob-
lem of measuring geographical markets. For example it further stated that:
A review of patient flow data, physician admitting patterns, and other facts
integral to a static analysis may all be important to a proper dynamic analysis,
since a picture of current competition must be drawn before competitive re-
sponses to changes in that competitive pattern can properly be considered. But
without looking at those facts in a framework considering potential competitive
responses to the current market picture, a relevant geographic area in which
competition may be substantially harmed will be extremely difficult to define. In
any event, the Chattanooga urban area is the area within which we will assess
the competitive effects of these acquisitions.
Id. at 23,337.
119. Id.
120. The Department will "identify a geographical areas [sic] such that a hypothetical
firm that was the only present or future producer or seller of the relevant product in that area
91 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW WINTER 1986
The relevant evidence that the Department will consider to ana-
lyze the effects of the price increases includes: (1) shipment patterns;
(2) evidence that buyers have considered shifting to other locations;
(3) price movements; (4) transportation cost; (5) cost of local dis-
tributors; and (6) excess capacity of firms in other locations.
The AMI case did not follow the guidelines approach. The
Commission did not approach the problem by looking at the possible
effect of price changes. Perhaps the inflow and outmigration percent-
ages would be higher if one assumed a price increase in the services
offered by the hospitals in the City of San Luis Obispo. This would
then suggest a broader geographical market than the one the Com-
missioner delineated.
Ironically, at the beginning of its analysis the Commission
stated:
'[A]n area is a separate geographic market if a change in the
price of the product in that area does not, within a relevant pe-
riod of time, induce substantial changes in the quantity of the
product sold in other areas' . . . . The geographical market is
defined under the Justice Guidelines in a similar fashion.1
2 '
The problem is that the Commission is only paying lip service to
its own statement. In contrast, in Hospital Corporation of America,
the Commission emphasized the importance of considering the "like-
lihood or unlikelihood that physicians and their patients in Chatta-
nooga would travel to outlying hospitals in the event of an exercise of
market power"'122 by the hospitals. Thus, the possible effects of price
changes are very relevant.
IV. Conclusion
The fact that the hospital industry has special characteristics
that differentiate it from other industries has not prevented the ap-
plicability of the antitrust laws to hospital mergers. All types of hos-
could profitably impose a 'small but significant and nontransitory' increase in price." U.S.
Department of Justice Merger Guidelines 2 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 1 4492 at 6879-11
(1984) (emphasis in original). The analysis will begin with the area of each merging firm.
Then the monopolist increases the prices it charges for its services. If the result is that its
patients will shift to a hospital in another location, then, if the increase in price was not profit-
able to the hypothetical hospital monopolist, the location of the second hospital will be in-
cluded in the relevant market. As in defining a product market, the analysis will continue until
there is a geographical area in which a hypothetical hospital monopolist could "impose a 'small
but significant and non-transitory' increase in price." Id.
121. 104 F.T.C. at 195 (quoting from Statement of Federal Trade Commission Con-
cerning Horizontal Mergers, TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) at 13 (No. 546, June 16, 1982)).
122. 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 22,301 at 23,337.
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pital corporations, even if they are non-profit corporations, may be
sued under antitrust statutes..
In terms of the measurement of the relevant market, courts
have determined that the "cluster" of general acute care hospital
service constitutes the appropriate product market. It seems that
non-hospital providers should be included because the collective sum
of their services serves as a restraint to the market power that a
hospital may possess. The Commission, however, has refused to in-
clude non-hospital providers in the relevant market definition. It has
reasoned that the collection of hospital services has economic signifi-
cance as a unique cluster of services that can only be provided by
hospitals. Although the "cluster" approach seems to be unfair to
hospitals by excluding non-hospital providers from the market, the
use of the guidelines would not change this result.
In regard to the relevant geographical market, hospitals will
have a hard time overcoming the evidence of patients' statistics, phy-
sicians' location and industry recognition that a well advised plaintiff
will bring to trial. On the other hand, under a Guidelines approach,
the market may be more broadly defined if hospitals can show that
patients are price-sensitive and will react to an increase in price by
going to hospitals in other areas. The approach taken by the courts
seems to be the correct one, however, because it actually looks at the
region where patients turn for services.
Since the analysis will generally lead to a narrow product and
geographical market even if the "cluster" approach is not used, hos-
pitals should measure the relevant market before they participate in
any merger, acquisition or even management of hospitals in order to
avoid a suit under the antitrust laws. Before entering into any
merger agreement the hospital owners should measure the market by
using both the "cluster" approach and the guidelines approach, al-
ways keeping in mind potential competitive responses to possible uses
of market power as indicated in Hospital Corporation of America.

